Reading in Political Economy

Volume 60 · Issue 2 · 2026
Pages 1382–1398

ISSN 0079-9874 (Print) · e-ISSN 0305-814X (Online) politonomia.org.ua/rpe

Infrastructural Sovereignty and the Political Economy of Palestinian Self-Determination

Abeeta Hilal [1], Dr. Showkat Ahmad Dar[2]

[1] Research scholar, Department of Political Science, (Sharda School of humanities and social sciences), Email: 2024103646.abeeta@dr.sharda.ac.in, Orcid id: 0009000341561816

[2] Assistant Professor - Political Science, Sharda School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Sharda University, Orcid id: 0000000224099493, Email: showkat.dar@sharda.ac.in

Corresponding Author: Dr. Showkat Ahmad Dar

Received: 24/06/2026 | **Accepted:** 06/10/2026 | **Published:** 17/11/2026

ABSTRACT

This study examines the relationship between infrastructural sovereignty and Palestinian self-determination through Samir Amin's theory of dependency and unequal development, focusing on Gaza and the wider occupied Palestinian territory. It situates infrastructural control within the broader political economy of occupation, external domination and structural economic dependence. The study aims to examine how Amin's concepts of peripheral capitalism, extraverted accumulation, disarticulation and the five monopolies explain the relationship between infrastructural control and political self-determination. It further investigates external control over essential resources, aid dependency, trade restrictions, customs arrangements and reconstruction, assessing the explanatory limitations of dependency theory in the Palestinian context. The study adopts a qualitative, interpretive and theory-driven case-study design, combining conceptual analysis of Amin's theoretical contributions, critical examination of Palestinian political-economy literature and secondary evidence drawn from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports published in 2025 and 2026. The findings demonstrate that external control over customs revenue, energy, water, borders, and currency and reconstruction materials restricts Palestinian productive capacity, institutional autonomy and economic decision-making. However, dependency theory alone cannot adequately explain Palestine's condition because of the absence of sovereign statehood, territorial fragmentation, settler-colonial domination, security politics and internal Palestinian political divisions. Gaza's transformation into a confined surplus population further challenges conventional assumptions concerning peripheral labour exploitation. The study establishes infrastructural sovereignty as an indispensable material foundation of Palestinian self-determination and recommends integrating dependency theory with settler-colonial and de-development perspectives. It argues that reconstruction policies must be evaluated not merely through financial commitments but through their capacity to transfer effective Palestinian authority over essential infrastructural and economic systems. Without such a transfer, reconstruction risks reproducing the structural dependence it seeks to overcome.

Keywords: Dependency; Infrastructure; Sovereignty; Gaza; De-development

How to cite: Hilal & Dar (2026). Infrastructural Sovereignty and the Political Economy of Palestinian Self-Determination. Reading in Political Economy, 60(2), 1382–1398.

© 2026 The Author(s). Published by Reading in Political Economy.

INTRODUCTION

Self-determination is conventionally treated as a political right, yet its exercise rests on material capacities: the ability to generate power, secure water, move goods, issue and manage money, and rebuild what is destroyed. Infrastructural sovereignty, defined here as authority over the physical and regulatory systems through which an economy reproduces itself, therefore sits at the centre of the Palestinian predicament. A people may possess institutions, flags and elections and still be unable to decide how its economy is supplied, financed or connected to the world. The scale of the problem is visible in recent evidence. Gaza's gross domestic product fell by 83 per cent in 2024, leaving the territory with only 13 per cent of its 2022 output (UNCTAD, 2025). The per capita GDP stood at US$212 in 2025, unemployment reached 78 per cent and reconstruction needs were estimated at US$71.5 billion (UNCTAD, 2026). Earlier scholarship had already shown how closure, military operations and administrative restrictions eroded productive capacity long before the war (Roy, 1987, 2016; Weinthal & Sowers, 2019).

The existing literature largely follows two tracks. Political-economy studies analyse de-development, neoliberal state-building and aid (Farsakh, 2016; Khalidi & Samour, 2011), infrastructure studies document targeting and what they call slow violence (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019). Samir Amin's dependency theory, with its emphasis on unequal development, peripheral accumulation and the monopolies through which the core reproduces dominance, is seldom brought systematically to bear on infrastructure as a question of sovereignty, and its explanatory limits in an occupied, non-state setting remain under-examined. This is the gap. The problem is analytical as well as practical: without a framework that links infrastructure to the structure of dependence, reconstruction risks being treated as a technical task rather than a political one. Few studies have asked whether control over infrastructure can be treated as a condition of political self-determination in the Palestinian case, and fewer have tested dependency theory against that question. Therefore, this paper makes an attempt to interpret Palestinian infrastructural control through Amin's framework testing where that framework fails. Its objectives are: to explain how Amin's theory relates infrastructural sovereignty to self-determination; to assess how far dependency theory accounts for external infrastructural control and structural economic dependency; to interpret aid, resource dependency, trade restrictions and reconstruction through the lens of unequal development; and to evaluate the theory's capacity to explain the barriers to Palestinian economic autonomy and political self-determination.

METHODOLOGY

The paper adopted a qualitative approach with an interpretive method, employing a theory-driven case-study design to examine infrastructural dependence in Palestine through the analytical framework of Samir Amin's dependency theory. Gaza was treated as a critical case because its infrastructural dependence was more comprehensive and its recent collapse more extensively documented than that of the West Bank, although the analysis extended to the West Bank wherever relevant evidence was available. The methodology comprised three components. First, a conceptual examination of Amin's principal works identified the analytical categories applied throughout the study, namely peripheral capitalism, extraversion, disarticulation, delinking and the five monopolies. Second, a purposive review of peer-reviewed literature on Palestinian political economy, de-development, international aid, and infrastructure and settler colonialism provided competing interpretations against which Amin's theoretical framework was examined. Third, the study interpreted documentary and institutional evidence concerning the disruption of Palestinian infrastructure and its implications for economic dependence and political autonomy. Data collected during and after armed conflict were subject to considerable uncertainty; therefore, reported figures were treated as indicative orders of magnitude rather than precise measurements. The reliance on a single institutional source for some quantitative evidence also limited the scope for triangulation. Since the study examined structural conditions and institutional relationships rather than drawing on primary fieldwork, claims concerning the intentions of political and institutional actors were treated as contested and attributed to the authors making them. The paper did not undertake an independent adjudication of legal questions, but acknowledged relevant international legal authorities where they informed the discussion.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Dependency Theory and the Link between Infrastructural Sovereignty and Self-Determination

Amin's starting point is that capitalism is a world system whose accumulation is organized at the global scale and whose development is inherently unequal (Amin, 1974, 1976). The centre and the periphery are not stages on a single path but two poles produced by the same process. In the periphery, capitalism takes a particular form. Growth is extraverted, oriented towards external demand and dependent on imported capital goods, technology and finance. The economy is disarticulated, meaning that its sectors are not linked into a coherent national system of production and consumption, and the surplus is transferred through unequal exchange and the worldwide operation of the law of value (Amin, 1977, 2010). Amin's position differs from the thesis of the development of underdevelopment, associated-dependent development and the structuralist tradition because it locates dependence in the articulation of modes of production and unequal exchange rather than in trade relations alone (Frank, 1966; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Prebisch, 1950; Dos Santos, 1970; Emmanuel, 1972). The dependency tradition can be understood as a research programme with four recurring commitments (Kvangraven, 2021): a global historical approach, attention to the polarizing tendencies of capitalism, a focus on structures of production and a focus on the specific constraints facing peripheral economies. This is the sense in which the framework is used here. Two further Amin concepts matter for the present question. The first is delinking, the subordination of external relations to the internal logic of national development, which is not autarky but the capacity to set priorities in the national interest rather than in response to external adjustment (Amin, 1985). The second is the argument that, after industrialization of parts of the periphery, the core maintains dominance through five monopolies: over technology, over global finance, over access to natural resources, over communication and media, and over weapons of mass destruction (Amin, 1997). These monopolies are the link between the abstract theory and infrastructural sovereignty, because each materializes in physical or regulatory systems.

Infrastructural sovereignty can be defined as authority to design, operate, finance, secure and regulate the networks on which economic reproduction depends. The idea draws on the notion of infrastructural power, understood as the capacity of a state to implement decisions throughout its territory, but reverses the emphasis by asking who holds that capacity when territory is under external control (Mann, 1984). Infrastructures are material forms that carry political rationalities, while technical expertise and networks can become instruments through which power operates while presenting itself as neutral management (Larkin, 2013; Mitchell, 2002). Read through Amin, infrastructure is where the monopolies take concrete shape. Energy and water embody access to natural resources, borders and customs embody control over trade and the terms of exchange, banking and currency embody finance, communications embody media and technology, and the capacity to restrict the import of materials and to use force embodies the military monopoly. Table 1 sets out these correspondences.

Table 1: Amin's Analytical Categories Mapped onto Domains of Palestinian Infrastructural Control

Amin category	Infrastructural domain	Mechanism of constraint
Monopoly over access to natural resources	Water, energy, land	External control over supply, permits and fuel entry limits productive and civilian capacity (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019)
Monopoly over finance	Customs revenue, banking, currency	Revenues collected externally and subject to deduction or withholding; no national currency (UNCTAD, 2025, 2026)
Monopoly over technology	Construction materials, equipment, industrial inputs	Restrictions on dual-use goods govern what can be imported for rebuilding and production
Extraversion and disarticulation	Trade, labour and aid flows	Economy oriented to external demand, labour markets and donor funding rather than internal linkages (Roy, 1987)
Military monopoly	Borders, crossings, airspace, sea access	Security control determines movement and the flow of goods and people
Delinking	Energy, ports, customs, currency	Capacity to set national priorities presupposes control over these systems

Source: Author's synthesis of Amin (1985, 1997) with Roy (1987), Weinthal and Sowers (2019) and UNCTAD (2025, 2026).

The explanation of the link to self-determination follows from this mapping. Self-determination is not exhausted by the formal right to choose a political status. It also requires the ability to determine a development path, to allocate the surplus, to protect livelihoods from external shocks and to rebuild after destruction. Where the systems that make these capacities possible are controlled externally, the exercise of political choice is hollowed out. In Amin's terms, a polity without infrastructural sovereignty cannot delink, because it cannot subordinate its

external relations to internal priorities when the channels through which those relations pass are governed from elsewhere. The Palestinian literature supports this reading. The concept of de-development describes the deliberate prevention of the structural transformation required for an independent economy to emerge through restrictions on land, water, trade and credit, as well as the channeling of labour into the occupier's economy (Roy, 1987, 1995, 2016). This resembles Amin's disarticulation, although Roy locates the cause in policy and territorial control rather than in market forces alone. The Oslo-era arrangements formalized the constraint. De-development persisted after Oslo despite the peace process (Roy, 1999). A customs envelope tied Palestinian trade to Israeli policy, and a division of the West Bank into administrative areas placed most land and resources outside Palestinian jurisdiction. The statehood programme of institution-building and growth under occupation redefined liberation as technical governance, while neoliberal good governance could not substitute for the struggle for national rights (Khalidi & Samour, 2011). The analysis has shifted between neoliberal and colonial frameworks, which make different predictions about whether growth can precede sovereignty (Farsakh, 2016). Dependency theory sides with the second: development cannot be separated from the political conditions under which surplus is generated and controlled.

The analytical value of the framework lies in three insights. First, it reframes institution-building. A Palestinian administration may collect taxes, run ministries and deliver services, yet if its revenue, energy, water and borders are externally governed; it functions as a manager of dependence. This helps explain why the state-building agenda yielded fiscal fragility rather than autonomy. Second, it identifies infrastructure as a site of power rather than a neutral input. Decisions about fuel, cement, and electricity lines and customs clearance are decisions about the distribution of capacity, so that technical restrictions have political effects. Third, it directs attention to the reproduction of dependence over time. Because the monopolies renew themselves, one-off investments in infrastructure do not alter the structure unless control over operation, finance and regulation also changes. The framework also requires qualification at the conceptual level. Amin's theory presumes states, even weak ones that can in principle delink. Palestine is an occupied territory whose institutions operate within limits set by another authority, and whose sovereignty is contested. Infrastructural sovereignty is therefore not simply missing; it is structurally unavailable under current arrangements, which changes the question from how a periphery might delink to how any form of self-determination can be exercised without control over infrastructure. Settler colonialism is organized around access to territory, and its underlying structure suggests that the primary logic may be territorial control rather than the exploitation of labour or markets (Wolfe, 2006; Veracini, 2010). This does not displace Amin's analysis, but it shows that the dependency relation operates inside a broader structure of dispossession, which is why the paper treats the two as complementary. A further layer of the argument concerns time. Amin's analysis stresses that peripheral dependence is not a fixed condition but a relation that is renewed whenever the conditions of accumulation change. The Palestinian economy has passed through several regimes of integration: labour migration to the occupier's economy and the use of the territories as a captive market from 1967, the closure regime from the early 1990s, the Oslo-era institutional arrangements, the post-2007 blockade of Gaza, and the destruction and reconstruction cycle that followed repeated military operations. Each regime altered the form of dependence preserving its core, which is the absence of Palestinian authority over the systems through which the economy is supplied and financed. This continuity is what the concept of infrastructural sovereignty is designed to capture. It shifts attention from the particular policy of a given period to the persistent location of control

The relationship also has a political dimension that Amin treats as inseparable from the economic one. The choice of a development model is political, and the class alliances that sustain a particular model determine whether delinking is attempted (Amin, 1985). In the Palestinian setting, the alliance between a section of the national bourgeoisie, donor agencies and the administrative apparatus created after Oslo has given an interest in stability within existing limits rather than in challenging them (Khalidi & Samour, 2011). The political economy of self-determination therefore involves not only external constraint but also the question of which internal groups have an interest in maintaining the present arrangements. A dependency reading thus avoids two simplifications: that Palestinian dependence is entirely externally imposed, and that it is entirely the product of local choices. It is produced by the interaction of external control and internal alliances, and it is reproduced through infrastructure because infrastructure is where both operate in material form.

It is also necessary to specify what the concept of infrastructural sovereignty adds to Amin's categories rather than merely illustrating them. Amin's five monopolies are formulated at the level of the world system, and they describe how advanced capitalist centres retain advantages after parts of the periphery industrialize. The Palestinian case operates at a smaller scale and in more direct form, because the monopolies are exercised not through markets alone but through physical presence and administrative authority over the territory in which the periphery's economy is located. The concept therefore helps to translate a theory of global structure into an analysis of local mechanisms, and it indicates a research question that Amin did not pose: what happens to the logic of dependence when the core's control is not remote but territorial. Amin's framework explains the relationship as one of constitutive dependence. Infrastructural sovereignty is the material expression of the capacities that self-determination requires. Its absence reproduces the extraversion, disarticulation and external surplus control characteristic of peripheral capitalism, and it converts formal political institutions into administrators of limits that they did not set. The explanation is strongest as an account of how economic structure constrains political choice, and weakest as an account of why the constraint was imposed and enforced, a matter taken up in the next section.

External Infrastructural Control, Structural Dependency and the Limits of Explanation

Dependency theory explains external infrastructural control and structural economic dependency in Gaza and the wider Palestinian territories, and where its explanatory power ends. The evidence of control is documented across several domains. Water, energy and agricultural infrastructures in both territories have been targeted or restricted in ways that undermine livelihoods, as demonstrated by an original database and interview evidence (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019). In the West Bank, restrictions on infrastructure development and damage to essential systems operate as slow violence that accumulates over time; in Gaza, recurrent hostilities have produced extensive destruction and the blockade has hindered effective reconstruction (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019). At the outset of the occupation, water and electricity networks were integrated with those of Israel, while sanitation was left to Palestinian management, fixing dependence in the design of the networks themselves (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019). Fiscal and monetary arrangements reinforce the pattern. Palestinian trade follows a customs regime in which revenues are collected by the occupying authority and transferred to the Palestinian Authority, and the economy has no national currency. Deductions and withheld revenues between January 2019 and March 2026 exceeded US$3.67 billion, equivalent to 83 per cent of total Palestinian net revenue in 2025 (UNCTAD, 2026). Such figures indicate that fiscal capacity is itself externally conditioned. At the productive level, decades of movement restrictions combined with military operations reversed development gains, returning Palestinian GDP to its 2010 level and per capita income to its 2003 level by the end of 2024 (UNCTAD, 2025).




Figure 1 Gaza Real GDP Index, 2022–2025

Derived from UNCTAD (2025, 2026): a decline of 83% in 2024 to 13% of the 2022 level, and growth of 34.2% in 2025. The 2023 value is calculated from the reported 87% cumulative decline over 2023 and 2024. 2025 growth is a statistical rebound from a collapsed base.

Source: UNCTAD (2025, 2026).




Figure 2 Gaza GDP per Capita, 2022, 2024 and 2025 (US$)

The 2022 value (about US$1,240) is derived from the reported 2024 figure of US$161 as 13% of the 2022 level and is consistent with the 2025 figure of US$212 at 17%. 2023 is omitted because a direct value was not reported. Table 2 summarizes the domains of control, and Figures 1 and 2 show the magnitude of the collapse and its limited recovery. A dependency reading draws a specific inference from them. An economy with strong internal linkages, diversified production and control over its own inputs would be exposed to shocks but could mobilize local capacity in recovery. Gaza's output depended on imported inputs, external demand, aid and permits, so that when the channels closed, little remained that could be reorganized internally. The 2026 report's finding that agriculture and industry were each 94 per cent below their 2022 levels and construction 99 per cent below (UNCTAD, 2026) illustrates the absence of a self-sustaining productive core. The rebound of 34.2 per cent in 2025 should be read accordingly, as a statistical effect of a very low base rather than evidence of recovery. The interpretive point is that the severity of the collapse reflects structural dependence interacting with destruction, and that the first cannot be inferred from the second without further evidence.

Table 2 Domains of External Infrastructural Control and Dependency Interpretation

Domain	Documented form of control	Dependency interpretation
Fiscal and customs	Revenues collected externally; deductions and withholding totaling over US$3.67 billion, 2019–2026 (UNCTAD, 2026)	Finance monopoly; fiscal authority without fiscal autonomy
Energy and water	Networks integrated with the occupier's system from 1967; targeting and restriction of supply (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019)	Monopoly over natural resource access; dependence built into network design
Trade and movement	Restrictions on goods and people; economy oriented to external markets and labour (Roy, 1987)	Extraversion and disarticulation; captive market and labour reserve
Production	Agriculture and industry about 94% and construction 99% below 2022 levels (UNCTAD, 2026)	Absence of an articulated productive core capable of internal recovery
Reconstruction	Needs estimated at US$71.5 billion; access to materials externally governed (UNCTAD, 2026)	Technology monopoly; reconstruction contingent on external permission

Source: Compiled by the author from the sources shown.

Dependency theory explains several features of this structure well. It explains why dependence is cumulative rather than incidental, since each domain reinforces the others: fiscal weakness limits investment in energy and water, which limits production, which sustains reliance on imports and aid. It explains the political economy of the Palestinian elite and the aid-financed state. A neoliberal programme served the interests of a segment of the national bourgeoisie and international investors, while crony capitalism within the Palestinian Authority enabled political connections to mediate economic access (Khalidi & Samour, 2011; Dana, 2020). These findings resemble the comprador pattern in Amin's analysis, in which local elites benefit from integration into the external order and thus have limited incentive to challenge it. It also helps to explain adaptive strategies. The tunnel economy that emerged under siege functioned as an improvised, informal alternative supply system and represented a form of partial and precarious delinking that remained dependent on the conditions of the blockade (Pelham, 2012). The limits of the theory are equally important, and Table 3 summarizes them. The first and most basic limit is the absence of a sovereign state. Dependency theory analyses peripheral states within the world

system and assumes that a national bourgeoisie or state could, under certain conditions, pursue autonomous accumulation. In the Palestinian case the authority that controls borders, customs, and airspace and key networks is external, and the occupied population is not the subject of a conventional national economy. The concept of spacio-cide describes the colonial reshaping of territory and the transformation of Palestinian space into fragmented, invisible enclaves, an analysis that begins from territory rather than trade (Hanafi, 2009).

The second limit concerns the relation between exploitation and elimination. Amin's theory explains peripheral poverty through the extraction of surplus, and the pre-1990s Gaza economy fits this account, with labour employed in the occupier's economy and a captive market for its goods (Roy, 1987; Farsakh, 2005). After the closure regime tightened, however, labour was no longer integrated on the same terms, and Gaza became increasingly a confined surplus population. The 2005 disengagement has been critically examined, while Gaza after disengagement has been described as a laboratory, a framing that points to the management of a confined population rather than its exploitation (Roy, 2005; Li, 2006). The occupation operates through repression that goes beyond exploitation, while the logic of elimination places access to territory rather than labour at the centre of the analysis (Hever, 2010; Wolfe, 2006). Where a population is excluded rather than exploited, value transfer is a weaker explanation than control of space.

Table 3 Explanatory Strengths and Limits of Dependency Theory in the Palestinian Case

Dimension	Where the theory explains well	Where it is limited
Structure of the economy	Extraversion, disarticulation, cumulative dependence across domains	Cannot explain why destruction itself occurs
Actors	Comprador-like elites and aid-financed institutions (Dana, 2020; Khalidi & Samour, 2011)	Underplays security politics and the role of armed actors
State and sovereignty	Constraints on delinking and autonomous accumulation	Presumes a state that can delink; Palestine is occupied and non-sovereign
Mode of domination	Value transfer, captive market, monopoly over inputs	Elimination and territorial control (Wolfe, 2006; Hever, 2010) exceed exploitation
Agency and context	Structural constraints on choice	Risk of determinism; regional and internal Palestinian dynamics (Hanieh, 2013)

Source: Compiled by the author from Amin (1997), Kvangraven (2021), Palma (1978) and the sources shown.

The third limit is the independent role of security politics and violence. Israel's official justification for restricting goods and movement rests on security concerns, which include the October 2023 attacks and the control of dual-use materials, and these claims are contested but cannot be dismissed as epiphenomenal. A strict dependency account would treat security as an instrument of the economic order, whereas the evidence indicates that security logics have their own dynamics and can override economic interests, as shown by the closure of labour flows that had previously benefited the occupier's economy. The theory cannot explain why a population was cut off from rather than exploited by the core. The fourth limit concerns internal politics and the region. Political Islam and the Islamic social sector form part of Gaza's internal political landscape, a dimension that a structural account alone does not capture (Roy, 2011). The division between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the authorities in Gaza, the roles of Egypt and Gulf states, and the influence of regional capital shape outcomes. Gulf capital has been central to economic restructuring in the Arab region and forms part of the context in which Palestinian dependence is reproduced, although a model of a single core and a single periphery obscures these layers (Hanieh, 2013). Critics of dependency theory more generally have argued that it can slide into determinism or treat concrete situations as instances of a formal theory. Dependency can be approached either as a formal theory of underdevelopment or as a methodology for analyzing concrete situations, with the latter offering the more useful approach (Palma, 1978). Approaches that locate the dynamic of capitalism in exchange relations rather than in class relations of production have been criticized, although Amin's emphasis on modes of production and class makes this critique less decisive against him than against Frank or Wallerstein (Brenner, 1977; Wallerstein, 1974).

The comparison between the West Bank and Gaza reinforces this reading. The mechanisms of control differ between the two territories, taking the form of slow, administrative restrictions in the West Bank and episodic, large-scale destruction in Gaza; the decline in living standards has also been less precipitous in the West Bank (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019). The difference matters for the explanatory question because it indicates that dependency is a common structural condition expressed through different instruments. In the West Bank,

dependence is reproduced mainly through permits, zoning and fiscal arrangements. In Gaza, it is reproduced through closure, the control of entry of goods and the repeated destruction of infrastructure. The West Bank experienced its deepest contraction on record in 2024, with GDP falling by 17 per cent, confirming that the structural condition is not confined to Gaza even where its intensity differs (UNCTAD, 2025).

Another consideration is the temporal pattern of dependence. Gaza's dependence was initially integrative, as labour in the occupier's economy and the market for its goods tied the territory to the Israeli economy (Roy, 1987). After closure, dependence took the form of confinement and reliance on aid. The shift implies that dependency in the Palestinian case is not one relation but a succession of relations and a theory that assumes a stable pattern of integration into the world system misdescribe at least one of them. This is a principal reason for treating the theory as a method rather than as a complete explanation. Dependency theory explains external infrastructural control and structural economic dependency to a substantial extent, particularly the fiscal, resource and productive dimensions, the cumulative character of dependence and the political economy of aid-financed elites. Its explanatory power is weakest where the evidence concerns territory, violence and security. The more defensible position is to use the theory as a method for analyzing a concrete situation in Palestine, as a methodology for analyzing a concrete situation, integrating settler-colonial analysis (Palma, 1978) to account for the territorial logic that the dependency relation alone does not capture.

Aid, Resource Dependency, Trade Restrictions and Reconstruction through Amin's Framework

The political economy of aid, resource dependency, trade restrictions and reconstruction can be interpreted through Amin's framework of dependency and unequal development. The four elements are treated together because, in the Palestinian case, they form one circuit: restrictions on trade and resources suppress production, aid compensates for the lost income, and reconstruction is required when destruction renews the cycle. Aid is the most visible element. In Amin's analysis, external capital flows are not neutral transfers. They integrate the periphery into the world system on terms that preserve the core's position, and they tend to finance consumption, services and the external orientation of the economy rather than articulated production. A growing literature reads Palestinian aid in similar terms. International assistance after Oslo served political purposes and underwrote the costs of the occupation, while the broader debate has questioned whether aid provided relief from conflict or delayed development (Le More, 2008; Taghdisi-Rad, 2011). Peacebuilding in the occupied territory has been interpreted as a form of counterinsurgency, while securitized development under the Fayyadist programme combined institution-building with authoritarian and security-oriented governance (Turner, 2015; Tartir, 2015). The political economy of foreign aid in the West Bank and Gaza after Oslo, and the ways donor funding reshaped Palestinian civil society and the power to protest, have both been examined in the literature (Brynen, 2000; Challand, 2009). The politics of international aid and the role of humanitarian categories in shaping the political identification of refugees in Gaza have also been examined (Qarmout & Béland, 2012; Feldman, 2007). The pattern across these studies is that aid is directed at managing the consequences of dependence, supporting a recurrent budget and humanitarian relief, rather than at building the productive base that would reduce dependence. The population of Gaza is now almost entirely dependent on international aid, while donor fatigue represents a further source of vulnerability (UNCTAD, 2026).


Amin's monopoly over access to natural resources is relevant because water, energy and land are the basic inputs of production and livelihood, and their control determines the viability of agriculture, industry and public services. The targeting and restriction of water, energy and agricultural infrastructure have created humanitarian crises and weakened livelihoods; agriculture is the most frequently targeted sector, undermining both income and attachment to land (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019). Eighty-six per cent of Gaza's cropland has been damaged and 83 per cent of its water wells have been destroyed (UNCTAD, 2025). When these inputs are controlled or destroyed, local production cannot substitute for imports, and dependence on external supply becomes a condition of survival. A dependency reading emphasizes that this is not only a consequence of war. It is a feature of an infrastructure that was designed, from the start of the occupation, as an extension of another system.

Trade restrictions and the fiscal regime constitute the finance and trade dimensions of the same structure. The Palestinian economy operates inside a customs arrangement in which import duties and value-added taxes are collected externally and transferred to the Palestinian Authority. This makes public finance dependent on decisions taken elsewhere. Cumulative deductions and withheld revenues reached about US$1.76 billion between

January 2019 and April 2025, equal to 44 per cent of total net revenues, and exceeded US$3.67 billion by March 2026, equivalent to 83 per cent of total Palestinian net revenue in 2025 (UNCTAD, 2025, 2026). Figure 3 presents the two estimates. In Amin's terms, this is the finance monopoly operating through fiscal channels: the periphery's public authority cannot plan, because its revenue is subject to external adjustment.

Figure 3

Cumulative Deductions and Withheld Palestinian Revenue (US$ Billion)



Source: UNCTAD (2025, 2026). The two periods overlap and the second estimate extends the first to March 2026.

Reconstruction is where the framework becomes most consequential. Gaza's recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at US$71.5 billion (UNCTAD, 2026). Reconstruction after previous hostilities was already governed by external mechanisms, and the internationally sanctioned blockade hindered effective reconstruction, while repeated cycles of destruction and rebuilding degraded civilian infrastructure and the economy (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019). Several implications follow from Amin's approach. First, if rebuilding depends on externally controlled access to materials, equipment and financing, it reproduces the technology and finance monopolies rather than overcoming them. Second, reconstruction financed by donors and executed through external contractors creates demand that flows largely to foreign suppliers, which is a form of extraversion even where the intention is humanitarian. Third, the concept of accumulation by dispossession raises the hypothesis that reconstruction markets may function as outlets for surplus capital, with benefits accruing to external firms (Harvey, 2003). This is a hypothesis, not a finding, because the evidence on who captures reconstruction contracts in the current period remains limited. A credible dependency analysis should treat it as a question for empirical investigation.

Table 4 Interpretation of Aid, Resources, Trade and Reconstruction: Dependency Reading and Alternative Reading

Element	Dependency reading (Amin)	Alternative or qualifying reading
Aid	Finances consumption and the recurrent budget reproducing external orientation (Le More, 2008; Taghdisi-Rad, 2011)	Humanitarian necessity; donors' own objectives and conditionality vary (Turner, 2015; Tartir, 2015)
Resources	Monopoly over water, energy and land access limits productive capacity (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019)	Destruction in war also drives losses (UNCTAD, 2025); security rationales are contested
Trade and fiscal regime	Finance monopoly through customs collection, deduction and withholding (UNCTAD, 2025, 2026)	Customs arrangements were negotiated and are also shaped by domestic Palestinian policy choices
Reconstruction	Reproduces technology and finance dependence; risk of external accumulation (Harvey, 2003)	Dual-use controls are justified by Israel on security grounds; donor and Gulf roles vary

Source: Compiled by the author from the sources shown.

Table 5 collects the principal indicators on which this section relies. The interpretive strength of the framework is that it connects the four elements into a single reproduction mechanism, which Table 4 contrasts with qualifying readings. Trade and resource restrictions suppress the productive base, which increases reliance on aid, which in turn finances the administration of the territory and the recurrent costs of the population the structure of dependence remains intact. When destruction occurs, reconstruction is again conditional on external permission

Table 5 Selected Indicators of the Gaza Economy, 2022–2026

Indicator	Value	Source
Real GDP, 2024 (change on 2023)	-83%	UNCTAD (2025)
Output relative to 2022, end 2024	13%	UNCTAD (2025)
GDP per capita, 2025	US$212 (17% of 2022)	UNCTAD (2026)
Unemployment, 2025	78%	UNCTAD (2026)
Economic establishments damaged or destroyed	92%	UNCTAD (2026)
Reconstruction needs	US$71.5 billion	UNCTAD (2026)
Cropland damaged; water wells destroyed	86%; 83%	UNCTAD (2025)

Source: Compiled from UNCTAD (2025, 2026). Figures are estimates produced in wartime conditions and should be read as orders of magnitude.

and funding. The framework also helps to understand why an increase in aid does not by itself generate autonomy, because aid enters an economy whose linkages and control over inputs are external. The relation between aid and the fiscal regime deserves particular emphasis because the two together determine the autonomy of public policy. When revenues are partly withheld, as the UNCTAD estimates indicate, the authority must borrow, reduce expenditure or rely on donor transfers. The Palestinian government has borrowed heavily from local banks, drawn on the pension fund and accumulated arrears to private contractors, while the territories face the risk of a banking crisis (UNCTAD, 2026). In Amin's terms, this is the financial dimension of peripheral dependence: a public authority whose capacity to act is determined by external flows and the conditions attached to them. It also shows how fiscal dependence spreads into the domestic financial system, so that the stability of local banks becomes dependent on the same external decisions.

The framework also draws attention to the role of price and income effects. Prices in Gaza in 2025 were far above their 2022 levels while per capita income collapsed, leaving households facing a combination of low incomes and high costs for imported goods (UNCTAD, 2026). This is characteristic of an economy that cannot produce its own necessities and depends on imports whose supply is controlled externally. The explanation draws on the dependency concept of disarticulation, since a society whose production is not linked to its consumption must buy at externally determined prices. It is also a reminder that the distribution of the costs of dependence is unequal within the territory, falling most heavily on households without access to remittances, aid or privileged networks.

Resource dependency has a further dimension in the relation between humanitarian access and political leverage. Where the entry of food, fuel and medicine is governed by permission, the supply of basic necessities becomes a lever over the population and its political institutions. Humanitarian categories shape political identification in Gaza, while the territory's trajectory has been described as a shift from de-development to a condition in which it is treated as a hostile entity (Feldman, 2007; Roy, 2016). This account indicates that dependence on aid is not simply an economic state but a political relationship in which the provision of subsistence is conditional. In this respect the Palestinian case extends Amin's argument, because the core's monopolies are used not only to extract or to shape accumulation but also to govern a population directly. Finally, reconstruction raises the question of governance. The design of any reconstruction programme involves decisions about who finances, who builds, who owns the resulting assets and who regulates their operation. If donors finance and external contractors build, access to materials and the operation of power, water and ports remain subject to external approval, the resulting infrastructure function as an extension of the existing dependence. By contrast, a programme that transfers ownership and operational authority to Palestinian institutions builds local productive capacity and secures predictable access to inputs would begin to alter the structure. The difference between these two models is the difference between rebuilding assets and rebuilding sovereignty, and it is the central policy implication of the dependency reading. The qualifications are significant. First, aid is not only an instrument of the core. It is also a lifeline for a population facing acute deprivation, and treating it solely as a

mechanism of dependence risks obscuring its humanitarian function. Second, the claim that restrictions are purely economic in purpose ignores the security justifications offered by Israel and the real security concerns after the attacks of October 2023, which a balanced analysis must acknowledge even where it contests their proportionality. Third, unequal exchange in Amin's technical sense, a transfer of value through trade between regions with different wages and productivity, has not been measured for Palestine, so the application is by analogy. Fourth, Palestinian actors have made policy choices that shape outcomes, including fiscal and development strategies adopted under the Authority and the governance of Gaza after 2007, and a structural account must not erase these choices. Amin's framework offers a persuasive interpretation of the structure within which aid, resources, trade and reconstruction operate and a useful prediction that reconstruction on current terms reproduces dependence, but that empirical claims about which benefits require further research.

Structural Barriers to Economic Autonomy and Political Self-Determination

The fourth question asks to what extent dependency theory explains the structural barriers to Palestinian economic autonomy and political self-determination, particularly in Gaza. Barriers can be grouped into five: fiscal, territorial, institutional, donor-related and security-related. The theory is strongest on the first and the fourth, partial on the third and weakest on the second and fifth. The fiscal barrier follows from the arrangements discussed above. A public authority whose revenue is externally collected and subject to deduction cannot sustain autonomous planning. The Palestinian economy grew by 4.3 per cent in 2025 but remained 20 per cent below its 2022 level; the Palestinian government had also borrowed heavily from local banks and faced an escalating financial crisis (UNCTAD, 2026). Amin's theory predicts that fiscal subordination leads to dependence on external finance, and the evidence is consistent with this. The territorial barrier is less well captured by the theory. Fragmentation among the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, and within the West Bank by administrative zoning, prevents the formation of a contiguous economic space. Figure 4 shows that Gaza's share of Palestinian GDP fell from 17.4 per cent before October 2023 to less than 4 per cent in 2025, illustrating how the territory has been economically marginalized within the Palestinian economy as well as externally.




Figure 4 Gaza Share of Palestinian GDP

Source: UNCTAD (2026). The 2025 value is reported as less than 4% and is plotted at 4% as an upper bound.

Source: UNCTAD (2026). Bars show the percentage by which sectoral output in 2025 fell below its 2022 level.

The reshaping of Palestinian space produces a fragmented territory in which Palestinians become invisible to the economic and political order, while architecture, planning and the control of vertical and horizontal space operate as instruments of occupation (Hanafi, 2009; Weizman, 2007). These practices form part of the longer history of colonial power (Gregory, 2004). Dependency theory, which analyses relations among economies, does not by itself explain territorial strategies of this kind, and settler-colonial analysis is better equipped to do so. The occupation evolved from colonization to separation, with control operating through a combination of administrative, legal and military instruments (Gordon, 2008). The colonial character of the Israeli project in Palestine has also been examined (Zureik, 2016). These analyses indicate that the barrier is not only the economic subordination of the periphery but also the denial of contiguous territory on which a national economy could be built.




Figure 5 Output of Selected Gaza Sectors Relative to 2022 Levels

Figure 5 shows the extent of productive destruction. When agriculture and industry are 94 per cent below their 2022 levels and construction 99 per cent below, a national economy cannot be reconstituted through market mechanisms alone. The sectoral data are relevant to the autonomy question because productive capacity is the basis on which an economy might move away from aid. The shift from de-development to economic warfare in Gaza has involved treating the territory as a hostile entity and separating it from the West Bank (Roy, 2016). The dependency framework acknowledges the outcome, an economy without articulated production, but it requires the supplement of de-development and settler-colonial analysis to explain why that outcome was pursued.

Table 6 Structural Barriers to Palestinian Autonomy and the Explanatory Reach of Dependency Theory

Barrier	Description	Dependency theory	Complementary lens
Fiscal	Externally collected revenue; deductions and withholding (UNCTAD, 2026)	Strong	Political economy of public finance
Territorial	Fragmentation of West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza (Hanafi, 2009)	Partial	Settler colonialism (Wolfe, 2006)
Institutional	Aid-financed institutions; elite capture (Dana, 2020; Khalidi & Samour, 2011)	Moderate to strong	State-society analysis
Donor-related	Conditionality and securitized development (Tartir, 2015; Turner, 2015)	Strong	Critical Peacebuilding
Security-related	Closure, military operations and dual-use controls	Weak	Security studies; international law

Source: Compiled by the author from the sources shown.

The institutional and donor-related barriers are where the theory finds its clearest application. State formation under the Palestinian Authority and the constraints on its viability has been examined in earlier research (Hilal & Khan, 2004). The statehood programme has been criticized as an attempt to achieve liberation through neoliberal institution-building (Khalidi & Samour, 2011). The donor-supported order combined development with security governance, with consequences for political space (Tartir, 2015; Turner, 2015). Politically connected business interests benefited from this arrangement (Dana, 2020). Table 6 summarizes the relation between barriers and explanatory reach. The political economy that results is one in which institutions are sustained by external funding, which makes them responsive to donor priorities and constrains their capacity to represent a population that demands self-determination. This arrangement reflected a project in which neoliberalism and nationalism remained in tension (Haddad, 2016). The theoretical point is that dependence at the level of finance becomes dependence at the level of politics. The question of whether delinking is possible must be addressed. Amin's remedy for peripheral dependence is not isolation but a reorientation of external relations according to national development priorities, supported by control over finance, technology and resources. In the Palestinian case, the preconditions are what infrastructural sovereignty names: control over energy generation, water, ports and crossings, customs, currency and the supply of materials. Informal arrangements such as the tunnel economy showed both the demand for alternatives and their limits (Pelham, 2012), since they depended on the siege and offered no sovereign control. Without a change in the political conditions of the occupation, delinking in Amin's

sense is not available, and strategies of resilience or incremental improvement are unlikely to alter the structure. This is the strongest implication of the theory for policy: reconstruction that does not transfer authority over the systems it rebuilds reproduces the dependence that it addresses. The theory also has normative and legal blind spots. International law recognizes self-determination as a right and the continued presence of Israel in the occupied territory was found to be unlawful, with states having obligations arising from that finding (International Court of Justice, 2024). Such developments show that the barrier is partly political and legal, and that it is contested in forums where economic structure is not the only determinant. Dependency theory identifies the material conditions that make formal rights difficult to exercise, but it cannot specify the political or legal pathways by which those conditions may change. It also risks understating agency. Palestinians have adopted strategies of self-reliance, and the same literature that documents de-development documents persistent attempts to build economic alternatives. The tradition is most valuable when it identifies constraints without claiming that structures determine outcomes entirely (Kvangraven, 2021). The political barrier cannot be understood without the division between the authorities in the West Bank and those in Gaza. Since 2007 the Palestinian polity has been divided, with separate administrations and separate relations to donors, to Israel and to regional actors. A dependency reading shows how this division interacts with economic structure. The West Bank authority depends on external fiscal transfers and donor support, Gaza has been subject to blockade and humanitarian dependence, so the two parts of the polity have different vulnerabilities and different incentives. The division weakens the capacity for a unified economic strategy and reduces bargaining power in relation to the external actors who control the infrastructure. It is not, however, a purely structural product. It reflects political choices, ideological differences and contested legitimacy, which dependency theory can contextualize but cannot explain by itself.

The relation between economic autonomy and the right to self-determination as understood in international law and in Palestinian political thought. The claim to self-determination is not a claim to a particular level of income. It is a claim to the political capacity to determine the form of government, the use of resources and the relation to other states. Economic autonomy is an instrument of that capacity, not its substitute. This distinction matters because the statehood-through-growth programme assumed that economic indicators could stand for political progress (Khalidi & Samour, 2011). Dependency theory corrects this by showing that growth under conditions of external control can coexist with the absence of autonomy, and that a high level of aid can coincide with a low level of self-determination. It also cautions against the converse inference, that a collapse in income is the same as a loss of political agency, since political mobilization and institutional capacity do not map directly onto economic indicators.

The demographic and humanitarian conditions in Gaza make the question more acute. Economic activity has almost entirely collapsed, and the population is almost entirely dependent on international aid (UNCTAD, 2026). In such conditions the immediate priority is survival, and economic autonomy may appear a remote objective. Yet the dependency argument is that precisely this immediate condition is the product of a structure that predates the war and that reassert itself unless the terms of recovery change. Even under the most favourable scenario, with full access for reconstruction materials and generous international aid, Gaza would take decades to regain its pre-conflict level of economic activity (UNCTAD, 2025). The long horizon indicates that the barrier to autonomy is not a matter of a single policy decision but of cumulative structural damage, which supports the view that a strategy of recovery must be designed as a strategy of sovereignty. The evidence also invites reflection on the standards by which the explanatory power of the theory should be judged. A strong test would require that the theory predict outcomes better than its rivals. Neoliberal state-building theory predicted that institution-building and market reform would deliver growth and prepare the ground for statehood; the available evidence indicates that this prediction was not borne out (Farsakh, 2016; Khalidi & Samour, 2011). Dependency theory predicted that growth without control over finance, resources and borders would remain fragile and subordinate, which is closer to the observed pattern. Settler-colonial theory predicted that territorial control would continue to dominate economic considerations, which is also consistent with the evidence on fragmentation and closure. The theories are therefore not simple competitors. They differ in the dimension of the situation that they emphasize, and the empirical record supports a combined account more than any single one. The dependency theory explains the economic and institutional dimensions of the barriers to a substantial degree, particularly fiscal subordination, aid-financed institutions and the absence of productive articulation, but that it explains the territorial and security dimensions only partially. Its value is greatest when combined with analyses of de-development and settler

colonialism. Taken together, they indicates that the barriers to autonomy and self-determination are mutually reinforcing: territorial fragmentation and security control prevent the formation of an economy, economic weakness produces dependence on aid, and aid-financed institutions have limited capacity to challenge the arrangements that sustain them.

CONCLUSION

Infrastructural sovereignty constitutes one of the most fundamental conditions for meaningful Palestinian self-determination, as political freedom cannot be secured where the material systems sustaining economic, institutional and social life remain subject to external control. Samir Amin's dependency theory provides a significant analytical foundation for understanding this relationship through the concepts of extraversion, disarticulation, delinking and the five monopolies, which reveal how external domination operates not merely through economic dependence but through the systematic restriction of domestic productive capacity, institutional autonomy and strategic decision-making. Applied to Palestine, this framework demonstrates how infrastructural dependence has become embedded in the political economy of occupation, where restrictions on territorial access, natural resources, energy, water, customs, finance and productive activity constrain the possibilities of autonomous development. The Palestinian experience also exposes the limitations of Amin's framework, particularly its insufficient engagement with territorial fragmentation, settler-colonial domination, military violence and security arrangements, as well as its underlying assumption of an existing sovereign state capable of pursuing delinking. These conditions make Palestinian dependence more complex than conventional centre-periphery relations, since economic subordination operates alongside the denial of effective territorial and political sovereignty. Aid dependency, resource restrictions, externally regulated customs arrangements and reconstruction financing must therefore be understood as interconnected mechanisms within a wider circuit of economic reproduction rather than as separate development challenges. Reconstruction, under conditions in which Palestinians remain unable to exercise meaningful authority over the systems being rebuilt, risks restoring physical infrastructure without transforming the structures that produce dependence. The central challenge is consequently not simply the mobilization of financial resources or the rehabilitation of damaged institutions, but the redistribution of effective authority over energy, water, trade, customs, finance, productive resources and reconstruction priorities. This requires employing dependency theory in conjunction with de-development and settler-colonial perspectives to capture the economic, territorial and coercive dimensions of Palestinian subordination. Future empirical research must examine the scale and direction of value transfers through trade, the distribution of reconstruction contracts, the institutional conditions attached to external financing and the extent to which Palestinian actors exercise agency in determining economic priorities. Although the quantitative evidence remains provisional because it draws on a limited institutional source produced under wartime conditions, the broader structural argument remains significant. Without a transformation in the distribution of infrastructural authority, reconstruction remains vulnerable to reproducing the very dependencies it seeks to overcome. Palestinian self-determination cannot be realized through the restoration of infrastructure alone; it requires the capacity to govern, control and determine the purposes for which that infrastructure serves society. Infrastructural sovereignty is therefore not merely an outcome of political independence but one of its indispensable material foundations. A reconstruction process that restores buildings, networks and institutions without transferring control over them may rebuild the physical foundations of Palestinian life, but it cannot establish the foundations of a genuinely self-determined state.

Author Contribution

Abeeta Hilal contributed to the conceptualization, literature review, theoretical framing, research methodology, examination of documentary sources, analysis and interpretation of findings, and preparation of the manuscript. Dr. Showkat Ahmad Dar provided academic supervision, conceptual guidance, methodological direction, critical review and scholarly inputs throughout the research and manuscript development. Both authors reviewed and approved the final version of the manuscript for publication.

Ethical Consideration

The study was based entirely on secondary sources, including publicly available academic literature, institutional reports and documentary materials relating to Palestinian political economy, infrastructure and dependency. No human participants were involved, and no primary fieldwork was conducted; therefore, formal ethical approval

was not required. All sources have been appropriately acknowledged through in-text citations and references. ChatGPT was used only for grammatical correction and language refinement; intellectual ownership, analytical responsibility and the interpretation of findings remain with the authors.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this research.

Data Availability Statement

The data used in this study are derived from publicly available and appropriately cited secondary sources, including peer-reviewed academic literature, institutional reports, policy documents and published research on Palestinian political economy, infrastructure, dependency and settler colonialism. The documentary materials and scholarly sources informing the analysis are cited within the manuscript and included in the reference list. The study does not involve primary data collection or human participants. Additional information concerning the sources and materials used in the analysis may be obtained from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

REFERENCES

Amin, S. (1974) *Accumulation on a world scale: A critique of the theory of underdevelopment*, Monthly Review Press.

Amin, S. (1976). *Unequal development: An essay on the social formations of peripheral capitalism*. Monthly Review Press.

Amin, S. (1977). *Imperialism and unequal development*. Monthly Review Press.

Amin, S. (1985). *Delinking: Towards a polycentric world*. Zed Books.

Amin, S. (1997). *Capitalism in the age of globalization: The management of contemporary society*. Zed Books.

Amin, S. (2010). *The law of worldwide value*. Monthly Review Press.

Brenner, R. (1977). The origins of capitalist development: A critique of neo-Smithian Marxism. *New Left Review*, *I*(104), 25–92. https://doi.org/10.64590/9sc

Brynen, R. (2000). *A very political economy: Peacebuilding and foreign aid in the West Bank and Gaza*. United States Institute of Peace Press.

Cardoso, F. H., & Faletto, E. (1979). *Dependency and development in Latin America*. University of California Press.

Challand, B. (2009). *Palestinian civil society: Foreign donors and the power to protest*. Routledge.

Dana, T. (2020). Crony capitalism in the Palestinian Authority: A deal among friends. *Third World Quarterly*, *41*(2), 247–263. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2019.1618705

Dos Santos, T. (1970). The structure of dependence. *American Economic Review*, *60*(2), 231–236.

Emmanuel, A. (1972). *Unequal exchange: A study of the imperialism of trade*. Monthly Review Press.

Farsakh, L. (2005). *Palestinian labour migration to Israel: Labour, land and occupation*. Routledge.

Farsakh, L. (2016). Palestinian economic development: Paradigm shifts since the first intifada. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, *45*(2), 55 71. https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2016.45.2.55

Feldman, I. (2007). Difficult distinctions: Refugee law, humanitarian practice, and political identification in Gaza. *Cultural Anthropology*, *22*(1), 129 169. https://doi.org/10.1525/can.2007.22.1.129

Frank, A. G. (1966). The development of underdevelopment. *Monthly Review*, *18*(4), 17–31. https://doi.org/10.14452/MR-018-04-1966-08_3

Gordon, N. (2008). *Israel's occupation*. University of California Press.

Gregory, D. (2004). *The colonial present*. Blackwell.

Haddad, T. (2016). *Palestine Ltd.: Neoliberalism and nationalism in the occupied territory*. I.B. Tauris.

Hanafi, S. (2009). Spacio-cide: Colonial politics, invisibility and rezoning in Palestinian territory. *Contemporary Arab Affairs, 2*(1), 106 121. https://doi.org/10.1080/17550910802622645

Hanieh, A. (2013). *Lineages of revolt: Issues of contemporary capitalism in the Middle East*. Haymarket Books.

Harvey, D. (2003). *The new imperialism*. Oxford University Press.

Hever, S. (2010). *The political economy of Israel's occupation: Repression beyond exploitation*. Pluto Press.

Hilal, J., & Khan, M. H. (2004). State formation under the PA: Potential outcomes and their viability. In M. H. Khan, G. Giacaman, & I. Amundsen (Eds.), *State formation in Palestine: Viability and governance during a social transformation*. RoutledgeCurzon.

International Court of Justice. (2024). *Legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem* (Advisory opinion of 19 July 2024). https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186

Khalidi, R., & Samour, S. (2011). Neoliberalism as liberation: The statehood program and the remaking of the Palestinian national movement. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 40*(2), 6–25. https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2011.XL.2.6

Kvangraven, I. H. (2021). Beyond the stereotype: Restating the relevance of the dependency research programme. *Development and Change, 52*(1), 76 112. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12593

Larkin, B. (2013). The politics and poetics of infrastructure. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 42*, 327–343. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-092412-155522

Le More, A. (2008). *International assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: Political guilt, wasted money*. Routledge.

Li, D. (2006). The Gaza Strip as laboratory: Notes in the wake of disengagement. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 35*(2), 38–55. https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2006.35.2.38

Mann, M. (1984). The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results. *European Journal of Sociology, 25*(2), 185 213. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975600004239

Mitchell, T. (2002). *Rule of experts: Egypt, techno-politics, modernity*. University of California Press.

Palma, G. (1978). Dependency: A formal theory of underdevelopment or a methodology for the analysis of concrete situations of underdevelopment? *World Development, 6*(7–8), 881–924. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(78)90051-7

Pelham, N. (2012). Gaza's tunnel phenomenon: The unintended dynamics of Israel's siege. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 41*(4), 6–31. https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2012.XLI.4.6

Prebisch, R. (1950). *The economic development of Latin America and its principal problems*. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.

Qarmout, T., & Béland, D. (2012). The politics of international aid to the Gaza Strip. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 41*(4), 32–47. https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2012.XLI.4.32

Roy, S. (1987). The Gaza Strip: A case of economic de-development. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 17*(1), 56–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/2536651

Roy, S. (1995). *The Gaza Strip: The political economy of de-development*. Institute for Palestine Studies.

Roy, S. (1999). De-development revisited: Palestinian economy and society since Oslo. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 28*(3), 64–82. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538308

Roy, S. (2005). Praying with their eyes closed: Reflections on the disengagement from Gaza. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 34*(4), 64–74. https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2005.34.4.64

Roy, S. (2011). *Hamas and civil society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist social sector*. Princeton University Press.

Roy, S. (2016). *The Gaza Strip: The political economy of de-development* (3rd ed.). Institute for Palestine Studies.

Taghdisi-Rad, S. (2011). *The political economy of aid in Palestine: Relief from conflict or development delayed?* Routledge.

Tartir, A. (2015). Securitised development and Palestinian authoritarianism under Fayyadism. *Conflict, Security & Development, 15*(5), 479 502. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2015.1100016

Turner, M. (2015). Peacebuilding as counterinsurgency in the occupied Palestinian territory. *Review of International Studies, 41*(1), 73 98. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210514000072

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2025). *Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory*. https://unctad.org/press material/unctad-report-warns-economic-collapse-occupied-palestinian-territory-calls-urgent

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2026). *Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people: Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory*. https://unctad.org/publication/report-unctad-assistance-palestinian-people-developments-economy-occupied-palestinian

Veracini, L. (2010). *Settler colonialism: A theoretical overview*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Wallerstein, I. (1974). The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system: Concepts for comparative analysis. *Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16*(4), 387–415. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500007520

Weinthal, E., & Sowers, J. (2019). Targeting infrastructure and livelihoods in the West Bank and Gaza. *International Affairs, 95*(2), 319–340. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz015

Weizman, E. (2007). *Hollow land: Israel's architecture of occupation*. Verso.

Wolfe, P. (2006). Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. *Journal of Genocide Research, 8*(4), 387–409. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520601056240

Zureik, E. (2016). *Israel's colonial project in Palestine: Brutal pursuit*. Routledge.